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I. INTRODUCTION
China is in the puzzling position of developing free markets while still
nominally subscribing to Communist ideology. 1 Nowhere is this tension
more evident than in its real estate sector. 2 Developers are building awardwinning office towers, modern shopping malls, and five-star hotels, and tens
of millions of urban families are scraping together the money to buy their
own apartments. 3 At the same time, Communist doctrine prohibits private
ownership of property, and all land in China still is owned by the state or by
* Woolf, McClane, Bright, Allen & Carpenter Distinguished Professor of Law,
University of Tennessee College of Law (gstein@utk.edu). A.B. Harvard 1983, J.D.
Columbia 1986. This article is based on a presentation I gave at a conference at the
University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law honoring the career of Professor
Dale Whitman. I would like to express my gratitude to Professor Whitman for being
a fine mentor and role model to so many of us in the field of real estate finance. It
was an honor to participate. Don Clarke, Jeanette Kelleher, Ben Liebman, Xiao Kai,
and Xu Duoqi provided enormously helpful comments at different stages of my research on this paper. I am extremely grateful to the many real estate professionals,
professors, and students in China who were willing to meet with me and share their
experiences. I could not have written this article without their insight and assistance.
Thank you to the University of Tennessee College of Law, the W. Allen Separk Faculty Scholarship Fund, Shanghai Jiaotong University Law School, and the Fulbright
Scholar Program for supporting my research.
1. See XIAN FA [Constitution] pmbl. (2004) (P.R.C.) (“The basic task of the
nation is to concentrate its efforts on socialist modernization by following the road of
Chinese-style socialism.”).
2. See Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 1 (P.R.C.) (“This
Law is formulated with a view to maintaining the national basic economic system and
the economic order of the socialist market, clarifying the ownership of property [and]
giving full effect to the meaning of property . . . .”); id. art. 3 (“During the primary
stage of socialism, the State shall adhere to the basic economic system, with public
ownership playing a dominant role and diverse forms of ownership developing side
by side.”). See also Tudi guanli fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25, 1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988, Aug.
29, 1998 & Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004), art. 2 (P.R.C.) (“The People’s
Republic of China adopts socialist public ownership of land, that is, ownership by the
whole people and collective ownership by the working people.”).
3. The Property Rights Law establishes an ownership structure for apartments
within a larger building that resembles the condominium form of ownership. Wuquan
fa [Property Rights Law], arts. 70-83.
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agricultural collectives. 4 This doctrinal confusion does not seem to be holding back the real estate market, particularly in China’s major cities, which
have been booming for most of the last two decades.
China has adopted numerous written laws and regulations since the
1980s, but property law has lagged behind other areas of civil law. The first
Chinese law focusing specifically on property rights became effective on
October 1, 2007, 5 which means that China’s breakneck real estate development during the preceding two decades occurred in a nation with no published law of real estate. 6 China has only haltingly begun to adhere to inter4. Id. art. 47 (stating, in somewhat circular fashion, “[t]he urban lands are
owned by the State. Such rural land and the land on the outskirt of the city as belonging to the State according to law shall be owned by the State.”). Other articles in this
chapter confirm state ownership of “mineral resources, waters, [and] sea areas,” id.
art. 46, most “natural resources,” id. art. 48, certain “wild animals and plants,” id. art.
49, “[t]he radio spectrum,” id. art. 50, certain “cultural relics,” id. art. 51, “national
defence resource[s],” id. art. 52, and certain “[p]ublic facilities like railways, roads,
electric power, communications and gas pipes,” id. The new statute clarifies that land
“owned by the State” is owned “by the whole people.” Id. art. 45. Note as well that
the law prohibits the mortgaging of “[o]wnership of the land.” Id. art. 184.
The new statute clarifies that certain natural resources are not owned by the
state, but rather “are collectively-owned.” Id. art. 48. See also id. arts. 58-63 (elaborating on the types of property that are collectively owned and discussing some attributes of collectively owned property); id. art. 184(ii) (generally prohibiting mortgaging
of land use rights owned by collectives, even if occupied by “house sites, private plots
and private hills”).
5. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007) (P.R.C.).
6. While the Property Rights Law bears an effective date of October 1, 2007,
China had previously enacted other laws affecting legal rights to property. For example, the Land Administration Law was adopted in 1986, Tudi guanli fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25,
1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998 & Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28,
2004) (P.R.C.), and the Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate was adopted
in 1994, Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real
Estate] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994,
effective Jan. 1, 1995) (P.R.C.). The 2007 Property Rights Law, however, is China’s
first legislation since before 1949 to address property rights comprehensively. See
generally 3 CHINA BUSINESS LAW GUIDE 87, 151-52 (Kluwer Law Int’l 2005) (listing
and summarizing Chinese laws pertaining to property rights).
One of China’s first modern laws, the General Principles of the Civil Law,
recognized the right to “possess, utilize, profit from and dispose of . . . property.”
Ming fa tong ze [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 71 (P.R.C.).
See generally ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF
THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 248 (3d ed. 2004) (summarizing provisions of the
General Principles of the Civil Law relating to property). But at the time the General
Principles of the Civil Law became effective, “Chinese legal thinking about property
rights . . . had not yet matured; there also existed ideological obstacles regarding
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national rule-of-law standards, and there still is heavy reliance in China on
guanxi, or personal relationships and connections. 7 Chinese property rights
also are limited by communitarian considerations in ways that are unfamiliar
to Americans. 8 These factors ensure that property law as it is actually practiced in China diverges from the published legal rules. Thus, those who have
been buying, selling, and lending against Chinese real estate have been operating in a world of significant legal uncertainty. 9 Moreover, while a newcomer to American law can learn much by reading statutes, cases, treatises,
and academic articles, there are few similar sources in China.
This Article examines Chinese mortgage law as it actually operates in
the field, focusing on both legal and business issues. 10 During the summer of
2005, I interviewed dozens of Chinese and Western lawyers, bankers, real
estate developers, government officials, judges, economists, real estate consultants, law professors, business professors, real estate agents, law students,
and recent homebuyers. 11 Their comments offer reliable insights into how
China’s real estate markets truly function. The discussion that follows draws
on these conversations to examine China’s budding mortgage law practices,

whether the affirmation of property rights . . . would challenge the socialist principle
of public ownership of the means of production.” Id. at 249.
7. See, e.g., RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF
LAW 20 (2002) (“the notion that the PRC economy will be able to sustain economic
growth without further legal reforms that bring the system into greater compliance
with the basic requirements of a thin conception of rule of law is doubtful”).
8. See Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], art. 7 (“The attainment and exercise
of property rights shall comply with laws, social morality and shall not do harm to the
public interests and the legitimate rights and interests of others.”); id. art. 84 (2007)
(“In the spirit of providing convenience for production, life of the people, enhancing
unity and mutual assistance, and being fair and reasonable, neighboring users of the
real property shall maintain proper neighborhood relationship.”).
9. Yan Song, Gerrit Knaap & Chengri Ding, Housing Policy in the People’s
Republic of China: An Historical Review, in EMERGING LAND AND HOUSING
MARKETS IN CHINA 163, 174 (Chengri Ding & Yan Song eds. 2005) (“Progress is
impeded by the lack of an appropriate legal framework . . . . China’s privatization has
emphasized deregulation and decentralization, but a comprehensive legal framework
for regulation of economic behavior in the emerging housing market has not yet
formed.”).
10. I have previously described the system of land use rights in China, which
serves as a rough substitute for land ownership. Gregory M. Stein, Acquiring Land
Use Rights in Today’s China: A Snapshot from on the Ground, 24 UCLA PAC. BASIN
L.J. 1 (2006). See also infra Part II. For a thorough comparison of Chinese and
American mortgage law, see Dale A. Whitman, Chinese Mortgage Law: An American
Perspective, 15 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35 (2001).
11. Some of my interviewees hold sensitive positions in government or banking
and were quite candid in their remarks. Out of courtesy for the generosity of all who
met with me, I have chosen to refer to all contacts anonymously.
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including how they developed, how they comport with or differ from written
laws, and what questions they leave unanswered. 12
I first visited China as a Fulbright Lecturer at Shanghai Jiaotong University Law School during the spring of 2003. Amazed by the staggering scale
of the real estate development in Shanghai, I became curious as to how China
was succeeding in building new structures and rebuilding crumbling infrastructure so quickly in a partial legal vacuum. I returned two years later and
conducted this field research into the legal and business grounding for the
current Chinese real estate boom, interviewing a wide variety of experts in
various segments of the Chinese real estate industry. These professionals
come from a broad range of fields and backgrounds, with their only shared
attribute being a willingness to meet with an inquisitive foreigner. 13
Several features of the blossoming Chinese real estate sector quickly became apparent. These characteristics remind American lawyers interested in
China that their assumptions about the American real estate industry will not
necessarily apply in a nation with a strikingly different history and legal culture. First, the legal and business communities have fashioned their business
12. The classic example of field research into the development of informal norms
is ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW (1991). Professor Ellickson observes that “rural residents in [California’s] Shasta County were frequently applying
informal norms of neighborliness to resolve disputes even when they knew that their
norms were inconsistent with the law.” Id. at viii. He concludes from this that, “[i]n
many contexts, law is not central to the maintenance of social order.” Id. at 280. See
also Robert C. Ellickson, Of Coase and Cattle: Dispute Resolution Among Neighbors
in Shasta County, 38 STAN. L. REV. 623, 654-55 (1986) [hereinafter Ellickson, Coase
and Cattle] (presenting earlier version of his field-research results).
13. For a thoughtful discussion of the biases that are inherent in this type of information-gathering about the Chinese legal system, see Benjamin L. Liebman,
Watchdog or Demagogue? The Media in the Chinese Legal System, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 11-14 (2005). Professor Liebman observes that personal introductions are
critically important when conducting field research in China, a fact that unavoidably
leads to biases that can affect research results. Id. at 13. See also Ellickson, Coase
and Cattle, supra note 12, at 655 (“cooperative people were undoubtedly somewhat
overrepresented in [my research] sample”).
Professor Donald Clarke has observed, “[f]ieldwork can yield interesting and
original results, but unfortunately it typically does not yield representative statistics
unless great care is taken in selecting the objects of study.” Donald C. Clarke, Empirical Research into the Chinese Judicial System, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE:
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 164, 180 (Erik G. Jensen & Thomas C.
Heller eds., 2003) (citations omitted). He also has noted how difficult it is to find
reliable sources when conducting research into Chinese Law:
By piecing together information from [a wide range of] sources, Chinese
and foreign scholars have been able to assemble a picture of certain aspects of the Chinese legal system. That picture is by no means complete.
But fleshing it out requires a great deal of thought about what information
needs to be gathered and how it can be gathered effectively.
Id. at 167.
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approach largely from scratch. There is little received wisdom, today’s leaders have few mentors on whom they can rely, and many so-called experts still
operate by trial and error. Second, while China’s market is more open today
than it has been in at least a half-century, it is far from a free market. The
government intervenes in all aspects of the economy to a degree that is surprising to the Western observer. Third, the legal system is not transparent,
laws are not always applied and enforced as written, and there is much corruption. “Rule of law” is viewed by many Chinese as a Western construct
designed to preserve Westerners’ current advantage; it has not yet won its
battle against “rule by man.”
Fourth, China’s legal system is a responsive one. Rather than adopting
laws and regulations prospectively – an enormous task for a huge country that
has been reforming its legal and economic systems rapidly and dramatically –
the Chinese government often drafts them to address the crisis du jour.
Meanwhile, China’s creative business community continuously formulates
new ways to approach new problems without waiting for formal government
action. Market participants devise novel economic arrangements that subsequent legal developments expressly permit, or at least tacitly tolerate. The
business community often seems to be prodding the government to act, and
China’s legal system must struggle mightily to keep up. 14 In short, formal
law lags behind actual practice.
Part II of this Article offers some historical and legal background. Part
III examines the types of loans that are available to Chinese borrowers and
the types of lenders that are making these loans. These lenders expect to be
repaid, and Part IV raises the question of what assets a borrower has available
to offer to a lender as security for that repayment. Part V continues by addressing the lending standards these lenders apply before they agree to extend
credit. This analysis raises the more general question of where the lenders’
funds actually come from, and Part VI discusses the ultimate sources of these
funds. Part VII questions how stable the Chinese banking sector actually is,
and Part VIII offers some concluding thoughts.

II. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND
Mao Zedong led the Chinese Communist Party to power in 1949, but
China arguably did not complete the nationalization of its land until 1982, six
years after Mao’s death. 15 Ironically, market-based systems began to reap14. See Whitman, supra note 10, at 36 (describing some “features [of Chinese
mortgage law] which are either uncertain in operation, or which are unnecessary
stumbling blocks to the smooth and efficient functioning of the market in real estate
financing”).
15. See PATRICK A. RANDOLPH JR. & LOU JIANBO, CHINESE REAL ESTATE LAW
11 (2000) (noting that nationalization of land in China was not completed until 1982).
Jonathan Spence observes that early land reform efforts were extremely violent but
intentionally incomplete. JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA

181

1320

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

pear at about this time, hastened by Deng Xiaoping’s rise to power during the
late 1970s. Deng ignited China’s “reform and opening” policy in 1992, causing the Chinese economy to begin growing rapidly from a nearly dead stop.
The Chinese economic system, including its real estate sector, has developed
quickly since then, with spectacular acceleration since the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, private ownership of land remained prohibited during this era of transition and still is forbidden today. 16
China amended its Constitution in 1988 to read, “The right to the use of
land may be transferred in accordance with the law.” 17 This provision does
not permit private land ownership 18 but does allow the government to grant
land use rights for a specified term. 19 The government thereby created oppor-

490-92 (2d ed. 1999) (estimating that at least one million landlords and family members of landlords were killed during the early stages of Chinese land reform, but noting that rich peasants often were left alone so that adequate food production could be
maintained).
16. “According to Marxist theory, land is singled out as incapable of being regarded as a commodity, since it is not a product of man’s labour – land exists by itself.” Keith McKinnell & Anthony Walker, China’s Land Reform and the Establishment of a Property Market: Problems and Prospects, in THE IMPACT OF CHINA’S
ECONOMIC REFORMS UPON LAND, PROPERTY AND CONSTRUCTION 26, 31 (Jean Jinghan Chen & David Wills eds., 1999).
17. XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 10 (2004) (P.R.C.).
18. The sentence immediately prior to the one just quoted, which dates back to
the original 1982 adoption of this Constitution, was retained without change and
reads: “No organization or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or lease land, or
unlawfully transfer land in other ways.” Id. See also Ming fa tong ze [General Principles of the Civil Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Apr. 12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987), art. 73 (P.R.C.) (stating that “[s]tate property
shall be owned by the whole people” and that “[s]tate property is sacred and inviolable”). The first two sentences of Article 10 of the Constitution indicate that urban
land is owned by the state and that rural and suburban land is owned either by the
state or by collectives. XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 10. These provisions, when read
together, clarify that all land is state- or collective-owned, but that the state now holds
the constitutional power to transfer the right to use land.
19. Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real
Estate] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994,
effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 7 (P.R.C.). The legal status of land use rights draws additional support from a constitutional amendment that became effective in 2004, with
language that requires the state to pay compensation when it expropriates land. XIAN
FA [Constitution] art. 10 (“The State may, in the public interest and in accordance
with the provisions of law, expropriate or requisition land for its use and shall make
compensation for the land expropriated or requisitioned.”). The Land Administration
Law offers additional specificity about the legal status of land use rights. See Tudi
guanli fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l
People’s Cong., June 25, 1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998 & Aug. 28,
2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004), art. 2 (P.R.C.) (“No units or individuals may encroach
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tunities for private development 20 while it also “avoided abandoning the
Marxist principle of state ownership.” 21 The maximum permissible term for
a land use right is seventy years for residential property, forty years for commercial property, and fifty years for industrial and other types of property. 22
The party that acquires a granted land use right technically is required to
develop the land within two years, 23 but the government often fails to enforce
this deadline. Rights holders may pay an additional fee to extend the term,
may initiate the barely acceptable minimum amount of construction before
the two-year period expires, or may otherwise seek to extend the initial term.
The initial and subsequent holders of land use rights may transfer these rights
to others, within certain limits. 24 For example, in an apparent effort to head
on or transfer land, through buying, selling or other illegal means. The right to the
use of land may be transferred in accordance with law.”).
20. For a discussion of the relationship between security of land tenure in China
and economic growth, see Joyce Palomar, Contributions Legal Scholars Can Make to
Development Economics: Examples from China, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011
(2004). See also Donald C. Clarke, Economic Development and the Rights Hypothesis: The China Problem, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 89 (2003) (addressing relative importance of security of property and enforcement of contract rights).
21. STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO
184 (1999). Later modifications to the Chinese Constitution reflect the uneasy relationship between private property ownership and Marxist doctrine. For example, the
following language was added to Article 6 in 1999:
During the primary stage of socialism, the State adheres to the basic economic system with the public ownership remaining dominant and diverse
sectors of the economy developing side by side, and to the distribution
system with the distribution according to work remaining dominant and
the coexistence of a variety of modes of distribution.
XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 6. See also Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1,
2007), art. 3 (P.R.C.) (“The State shall consolidate and develop unswervingly the
public sector of the economy and at the same time encourage, support and guide the
development of the non-public sectors of the economy.”); Chengri Ding & Gerrit
Knaap, Urban Land Policy Reform in China’s Transitional Economy, in EMERGING
LAND AND HOUSING MARKETS IN CHINA, supra note 9, at 9, 14 (“As a milestone in the
evolution of the Chinese Constitution, the 1988 amendment is significant, because it
allowed the state to maintain ownership and at the same time promoted land market
development without provoking political turmoil.”).
22. RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 127-28. The constitutional amendment
authorized the granting of land use rights, but the State Council established the actual
durational limits by regulation. Id.
23. Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real
Estate], art. 25 (imposing penalty of up to twenty percent of fee paid for land use right
if land is not developed within one year and allowing for forfeiture of land use right if
land is not developed within two years).
24. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], art. 143 (“Except as otherwise provided
for by law, the owner of the right to the use of land for construction use shall have the
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off speculation in undeveloped land, the law prevents the initial holder of a
residential land use right from transferring the right to a third party until it has
constructed at least 25% of the proposed structure. 25
Despite some superficial similarities, the Chinese land use right differs
considerably from the common law ground lease. 26 A party acquiring a land
use right must pay the entire cost for that right in advance; 27 the holder of a
land use right may not register that right until it has paid the fee in full; 28 at
right to transfer, exchange, make as capital contribution, donate or mortgage the right
to the use of land for construction use.”); RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 131-32
(discussing transferability of granted land use rights).
25. See, e.g., Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate], art. 38 (prohibiting grantee from further transferring land use right
before, “for housing construction projects, 25 percent of the total investment has gone
through”).
26. See Whitman, supra note 10, at 38 (noting similarities and differences between Chinese land use right and Western long-term ground lease); RANDOLPH &
LOU, supra note 15, at 18-19 (expressing belief that Chinese land use right is derived
from German civil law concepts and not from common law ground lease).
27. Although several speakers made this claim, the only statutory support I could
find for it is equivocal. Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Administration of
Urban Real Estate], art. 38 (“The transfer of real estate with the right of land use shall
comply with the following conditions: (1) All the fees in concern with the lease of the
right of land use have been paid in accordance with provisions prescribed by the contract for the lease and the certificate of the right to use the land has been obtained.”).
Implicit in this language is the suggestion that the contract might provide for payments over time. One Chinese lawyer indicated that the practice requiring advance
payment in full has recently been modified and that some owners have been permitted
to pay the fee on a periodic schedule that is similar to regular rent payments. This
newer method allows the government to spread out its receipt of the income from the
sale of the land use right over a period of time.
28. RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 152. The new Property Rights Law
addresses registration. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], arts. 9-22, 139. Article
139 provides, “[t]he right to the use of land for construction use shall be set upon
registration.” Id. art. 39. See also Tudi guanli fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25, 1986, revised Dec. 29,
1988, Aug. 29, 1998 & Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004), art. 12 (P.R.C.)
(“Any change to be lawfully made in land ownership, in the right to the use of land or
in the purpose of use of land shall be registered.”); Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa
[Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate], art. 35 (requiring registration of
ownership of real estate when it is transferred or mortgaged).
The registration requirement also applies to mortgages. See Danbao fa
[Guaranty Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 30,
1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995), art. 41 (P.R.C.) (“Where a party mortgages [certain
types of] property . . . , he shall register the mortgaged property, and the mortgage
contract shall become effective as of the date of registration.”); id. art. 43 (“Where a
party mortgages other [types of] property, he may of his own will, register the mortgaged property, and the mortgage contract shall become effective as of the date of
execution.”). There are incentives to register mortgages even when registration is
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least in some parts of China, the purchaser apparently may not use borrowed
funds for the acquisition of a land use right; the land to which use rights are
granted must be developed within a fixed amount of time or the right is forfeited, as just noted; there are official limits on the transferability of land use
rights, also as just noted; the holder of the land use right must own the building constructed on that land; 29 and land use rights are not subject to landlordtenant law. 30 The Chinese land use right thus is not a ground lease. 31
optional under Article 43 of the Guaranty Law. See id. (“If a party does not register
the mortgaged property, he may not defend against the claims of third party [sic].”).
The provisions of the new Property Rights Law appear to mandate registration of mortgages in all cases. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], art. 187 (“Where a
party mortgages assets [including houses and land use rights], he shall register the
mortgaged property, and the mortgage contract shall become effective as of the date
of registration.”). But see id. art. 199(iii) (referring to claims secured by unregistered
mortgages). These provisions of the new Property Rights Law take precedence over
any contradictory portions of the earlier Guaranty Law. Id. art. 178 (“In case of any
discrepancy between the Guarantee Law [sic] of the People’s Republic of China and
this Law, this Law shall prevail.”). Cf. id. art. 8 (“Where there are laws stipulated
otherwise in respect of property rights, such laws shall be observed.”).
29. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], art. 142 (“The ownership of the building,
structure and their accessory facilities built by the owner of the right to the use of land
for construction use shall belong to such owner, unless there is evidence to the contrary sufficient to invalidate that.”); id. art. 146 (“Where the right to the use of land
for construction use is transferred, exchanged, made as a capital contribution or donated, the buildings, structures and their accessory facilities affiliated with such land
shall be disposed of accordingly.”); id. art. 147 (“Where the buildings, structures and
their accessory facilities affiliated with a land for construction use is transferred . . .
[or otherwise conveyed], the right to the use of such land for construction use as being
occupied by such buildings, structure and their accessory facilities shall be disposed
of accordingly.”); id. art. 182 (“Where houses are mortgaged, the land use right to the
construction lot occupied by the houses shall be mortgaged at the same time. Where
the land use right to the construction lot is mortgaged, the houses fixed on the land
shall be mortgaged at the same time.”); Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the
Administration of Urban Real Estate], art. 31 (same). See generally JAMES M.
ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOK 739 (2d ed. 2005) (discussing this issue in context of registration of real estate transfers). See also infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text (addressing this issue in context of construction lending).
30. See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 125-26 (emphasizing that most of
Chinese landlord-tenant law does not apply to holders of granted land use rights); cf.
INVESTMENT IN GREATER CHINA: OPPORTUNITIES & CHALLENGES FOR INVESTORS 105
(CCH Asia eds., 2003) (observing that Chinese land use right displays elements of
both leasehold interest and contract right).
31. It should be evident from this discussion that the Chinese land use right is
both similar to and different from the Western ground lease. Because Chinese land
can be owned only by the government and because ownership of a land use right
carries with it ownership of the improvements on that land, the granting of a land use
right by definition severs ownership of the land from ownership of the building constructed on that land, just as the Western ground lease does. But because the holder
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One obvious question about China’s current system of land use rights is
what happens to the land use right and the structures on the land when the
term of the right expires. 32 Since the system of land use rights is only about
two decades old while most land use rights are granted for periods of forty
years or more, China’s legal system and real estate market have had little
occasion to address this question so far. It is reasonable to assume, however,
that even if Chinese government entities are not required to renew land use
rights that are nearing their expiration date, they will be willing to negotiate
extensions of these rights in exchange for the payment of a periodic or onetime fee. Pressure to implement such a policy is likely to increase as the first
wave of land use rights begins to approach its expiration date and the holders

of a Chinese land use right is required to own the improvements on that land, Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate], art. 31,
the developer must incur the capital expense of acquiring the land use right in its
entirety at the beginning of the construction process. The ground lease structure, by
contrast, allows the developer to avoid all or most up-front land acquisition costs.
The Chinese land use right, in short, is not a financing device.
32. The new Property Rights Law appears to require the government to renew
the land use right, at least for residential property. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law],
art. 149 (stating, “[t]he term of the right to the use of land for building houses shall
automatically renewed [sic] upon expiration,” while noting that for other uses, the
right “shall be renewed according to laws and regulations upon expiration”). This
provision does not address the duration of the renewal term, the question of whether
the holder of the right must pay an additional fee, or the issue of how any such fee
will be calculated.
Cf. Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real
Estate], art. 21 (providing that (i) holder of land use right that wishes to extend it must
apply for such an extension no later than one year before right expires; (ii) such applications “shall be approved”; and (iii) land user shall execute a new contract “and pay
fees accordingly for the use in accordance with the provisions”). This article of the
statute does not clarify what the duration or price of the extension shall be. Id. Professors Randolph and Lou have argued that this article requires the government to
renew, effectively giving the holder of the land use right a right of first refusal, but
Article 21 does not specifically state this. Compare RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note
15, at 128-29, with Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Administration of
Urban Real Estate], art. 21. One expert suggested to me that a more accurate translation of Article 21 is that these applications “should be approved,” which implies a
greater level of government discretion. Cf. Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on
the Administration of Urban Real Estate], art. 21. Also noteworthy is Article 58 of
the Land Administration Law, which states that the government may re-take land
formerly subject to land use rights if the holder of the right fails to seek an extension
“or, if he has, [and] the application is not approved.” Tudi guanli fa [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 25,
1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998 & Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug. 28,
2004), art. 58(3) (P.R.C.).
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of those rights discover that lenders have become unwilling to finance construction or renovation on the land. 33
The amount of this extension or renewal fee could fall within a wide
range. 34 At the high extreme, the fee could amount to an annual payment
equal to the fair market rental value of the land at the time of the renegotiation, perhaps with periodic increases built in (or, equivalently, a one-time fee
that is equal to the discounted present value of this rental stream over the
duration of the extension period). Land use rights renewed under such a system would resemble Western ground leases to a somewhat greater extent than
current Chinese land use rights do, with the government serving as ground
lessor. At the low extreme, the government might seek only a small percentage of the value of the land each year. If this occurs, China will have adopted
a real property revenue-generation system not unlike that followed in much of
the United States. Under this regime, holders of land use rights could maintain their occupancy for the duration of the renewal term on the condition that
they make regular payments to the government in an amount that is far lower
than the rental value of the property. The fee a Chinese right-holder would
pay to maintain its land use right would be loosely analogous to ad valorem
real property tax payments in the United States. If these rights were renewable indefinitely, the holding of a land use right would be tantamount to ownership.
The Chinese land use right system also functions as a zoning arrangement to some degree. When the government announces the availability of
land, it places limits on the uses it will permit for that land, and it restates
these limits in the written document that it executes with the eventual purchaser of the land use right. 35 The government thereby achieves by contract
what American jurisdictions accomplish under a variety of land use laws.
The establishment and transfer of land use rights is not the only method of
land use control in China – and land that is not subject to land use rights is
not restricted by these types of controls at all – but the land use right serves as
one component of an overall land use system. 36 Moreover, the division of
33. See Whitman, supra note 10, at 38 (noting the “general expectation that
granted land use rights will be renewed upon their expiration”).
34. See, e.g., McKinnell & Walker, supra note 16, at 33 (suggesting that Hong
Kong’s method of addressing this issue so far has been more effective than China’s).
35. See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 391-92 (setting forth provisions
regulating land use that are included in an official form of contract for granting of
land use rights on state-owned land).
36. For more on the regulation of the use of land in China, see generally Tudi
guanli fa [Land Administration Law]. For instance, Article 17 of the Land Administration Law requires that governments at all levels “draw up overall plans for land
utilization . . . for national economic and social development, the need for improvement of national land and for protection of the natural resources and the environment,
the capacity of land supply, and the demand for land by various construction projects.” Id. art. 17.
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land into government-owned land and land owned by agricultural collectives
also serves as a rudimentary form of zoning. 37

III. TYPES OF LOANS AND LENDERS
Commercial loans in China, much like those in the United States, come
in two varieties and serve two different objectives. A developer may seek a
project loan, which is essentially a construction loan, and also may seek a
cash-flow loan to be used for daily operation of the completed building,
which resembles the American permanent loan. Project loans usually are
issued for a term of twelve to eighteen months, suggesting that construction
schedules in China are extremely fast, and certainly much faster than in the
United States. Any visitor to China can attest to the fact that developers erect
buildings very quickly. Construction sites often operate – noisily – twentyfour hours per day, seven days per week, with plenty of willing laborers from
the provinces to keep projects moving ahead unrelentingly.
Project loans are disbursed in periodic installments, 38 but borrowers
sometimes can negotiate for a modest amount to be advanced initially in a
lump sum. Although project loans are available for terms of more than
twelve months, one developer explained that his company prefers loans with
a term of no more than twelve months because the loan then is considered a
short-term loan. Short-term loans require the borrower to meet fewer application formalities and are less closely supervised. If construction ends up taking longer than the projected twelve months, it is relatively straightforward
for the borrower to obtain an extension of the term of the project loan,
37. One expert observed that some agricultural collectives own land that has
been converted to commercial uses. This land frequently is located in suburban areas
where the neighboring city has sprawled, raising the value of the collective’s agricultural land and making it more attractive to commercial developers. The collectives
fear that if this land is requisitioned by the state and converted from allocated to
granted land, the developer or the state will enjoy the profit that results from converting farmland to commercial use. Some of these collectives have received permission
to build commercial structures on their allocated land themselves. This places them
in a position in which they can retain the profits resulting from the change in land use
and pass them along to the members of the collective in the form of dividends. See
also RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 61 n.8 (discussing this phenomenon). Note,
however, that collective-owned land may not be mortgaged. Wuquan fa [Property
Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16,
2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 184(ii) (P.R.C.); Danbao fa [Guaranty Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1,
1995), art. 37(2) (P.R.C.).
38. See Danhao fa [Guaranty Law], art. 59 (defining “[a] mortgage of maximum
amount” as a mortgage of property “to secure the creditor’s claims which occur successively during a given period of time and to the extent of the total amount of the
claims”). See also Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], arts. 203-07 (addressing, but
not defining, mortgages of maximum amount).
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thereby avoiding the stricter regulations that would have applied had the developer sought a longer-term loan from the outset.
Cash-flow loans generally are not relevant to the construction of residential buildings, as the developer conveys the residential units upon completion of the building and the individual residential buyers secure their own
financing. For commercial buildings that are to be rented out, cash-flow
loans with a term of three to five years are common, 39 and the same lender
that provided the project loan for the building frequently will extend the subsequent cash-flow loan to the developer. Interest rates tend to be lower for
cash-flow loans than for project loans, presumably reflecting the lower risks
of holding developed property as compared to developing it.
Despite the availability of cash-flow loans, one developer explained, developers would prefer to sell units, even in commercial buildings, rather than
retain them. This preference may reflect a belief that the market is near its
peak now and there is nothing to be gained by waiting to sell. Whether the
developer plans to sell the completed units or retain them, defaults on project
and cash-flow loans are rare, because property values have been increasing
steadily. Property owners thus have both the incentive and the ability to keep
their loan payments current.
The experts I met all agreed that commercial real estate lenders are almost exclusively domestic mainland Chinese banks. Other loan funds come
from lenders in Taiwan and Hong Kong. Nations with large expatriate Chinese populations, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, also serve
as significant sources of mortgage loan funds.
Residential loans pose particularly interesting issues. By all accounts,
prices for residential real estate in Shanghai far exceed what the typical buyer
ought to be able to afford. Yet buyers keep buying and lenders keep lending,
and the default rate has remained low. Nearly every person I spoke with confirmed that lenders require verification of official income before they will
lend to a residential buyer, and nearly all of these people agreed that the income statements employers supply to lenders often overstate the typical applicant’s income significantly. (One Chinese expert vehemently disagreed,
insisting that a typical bank analysis was more rigorous than this.) While
most lenders recognize that these statements probably are unreliable, they
make these residential loans anyway and merely require the untrustworthy
documentation for their files. Lenders, in short, routinely extend credit fully
aware that the actual official income of the average borrower to whom they
lend will be insufficient to cover the monthly loan payment. In addition,
there are no national credit reporting agencies in China, which means that

39. As foreign lenders have entered this market, the terms for cash-flow loans
have begun to increase. One foreign lender is reportedly extending permanent loans
with twelve-year terms.
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lenders have no dependable means of assessing the overall financial reliability of their loan applicants. 40
So how do residential buyers make their payments? To begin with, reported income is only part of the story for most Chinese. In addition to the
income reported from their official – and therefore taxable – jobs, many
workers earn “gray” income from various sources. As I heard repeatedly, this
income usually is in cash, some of it may not be legal, and nearly all of it
goes untaxed by the government. Lenders assume, and perhaps receive informal assurances, that their borrowers have other sources of income that
cannot be officially verified. In addition, borrowers frequently obtain shortterm loans from family members to help them make their regular payments
on their acquisition loans. Thus, the purchase of a residential unit becomes a
family affair, and several generations may be contributing to the purchase.
With home prices appreciating as rapidly as they have in the past several
years, many buyers are making their purchases largely for investment purposes. If their loan payments become more than they can handle, they can
sell their apartments quickly and at a significant profit. In fact, I heard over
and over of investors who buy multiple residential units with the idea of selling them within a few months. These buyers do not expect to rent the apartments out, and many units lack such basic features as interior doors and
plumbing fixtures. The owners hold these apartments empty and wait a few
months while the property appreciates. As a result, many of the new residential units in Shanghai have never actually been occupied. These apartments
are commodities, not residences.
The murkiness and unreliability of lending standards, particularly for
residential loans, probably goes a long way toward explaining why a secondary market in real estate loans has not yet developed in China. 41 Some Chinese real estate experts were simply unfamiliar with the concept of a secondary mortgage market, and several greeted my inquiries about such a market
with “mei you,” 42 signifying “we don’t have this.” Other experts seemed
keenly aware of the absence of a market in which residential mortgage loans
can be securitized and the need for such a market, with one professor explaining that the government previously had prohibited the securitization of mort43
gage loans, a policy it has recently taken steps to reverse. Several experts

40. I was told that this problem exists to an even greater degree in the growing
automobile loan industry, with lenders having great difficulty tracking down this
mobile collateral after a borrower defaults.
41. See generally Whitman, supra note 10, at 57-58 (describing beneficial features of secondary mortgage market).
42. This universal response translates literally as “don’t have,” but I quickly
grasped that this multi-purpose rejoinder can signify anything from “I don’t understand” to “don’t bother me.”
43. This professor implied that the government wants the lenders’ percentage of
nonperforming loans to go no higher than it currently is. By compelling banks to
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stated that there have been securitizations in China, but upon further questioning, it appeared that they were actually speaking of participations: in every
such case, the speaker was referring to the sale of fractional interests in a
large mortgage on a single property rather than the issuance of securities
backed by a pool of smaller mortgages.
Given the low rate of residential loan defaults during the past decade –
an era in which the number of homeowners has mushroomed – banks simply
may not see any reason to reduce or spread the risk of holding a portfolio of
individual mortgage loans. A small group of lenders controls a huge share of
the residential market, and these lenders may see little need to sell loans to
raise cash when they already hold enormous reserves of depositors’ sav44
ings. The government appears to recognize the value of securitization and
the ways in which the availability of securitization would ease overall access
to credit and help smooth out regional disparities in the availability of funds.
Several speakers referred to new tax and accounting policies dating back to
2005 that are designed to encourage the growth of a secondary mortgage
market, and one spoke of an increase in the number of domestic ratings agencies. This seems to be one area in which foreign participants in the Chinese
real estate market will have many skills and much experience to offer. However it happens, China soon may see the growth of a secondary mortgage
market. So far, though, the Chinese real estate industry has been able to
flourish without one.

IV. WHAT DOES THE BORROWER HAVE TO OFFER AS SECURITY?
Developers in China, like those in the West, would prefer to limit their
personal risk and maximize their leverage by borrowing funds. They may
take advantage of several direct and indirect sources of loans. To a certain
extent, they may be able to mortgage their land use right to a lender in exchange for funds to be used for the acquisition of that right or the develop45
ment of a structure to be built on the land. They can mortgage the partially
retain their most desirable loans, the government helps to ensure that the banks maintain or improve the overall quality of their portfolios.
44. See infra note 72 and accompanying text.
45. As a first approximation, it is correct to say that Chinese legal usage of the
term “mortgage” is similar to American usage. Article 33 of China’s Guaranty Law
states:
Mortgage as used in this Law means that the debtor or a third party secures the creditor’s rights with property listed in Article 34 of this Law
without transference of its possession. If the debtor defaults, the creditor
shall be entitled to convert the property into money to offset the debts or
have priority in satisfying his claim from the proceeds of auction or sale
of the property . . . .
Danbao fa [Guaranty Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., June 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995), art. 33 (P.R.C.). Both this Article and
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completed building to a bank. The developer can pre-sell units – in particular, residential apartments – and require that each buyer pay a deposit to reserve a unit. This prepayment is, in essence, a loan from the buyer to the
developer to be used to finance construction. And developers frequently delay payments to contractors, forcing these contractors to finance construction
involuntarily.
Different experts provided different answers to the question of whether
banks would lend in return for receiving a mortgage on an unimproved land
use right. One Chinese lawyer stated that lenders will not lend funds to developers to pay for the granted land use right itself. The buyer must pay the
government in full with its own cash when the buyer acquires the right.
Lenders simply are unwilling to lend until they know that the borrower already has acquired the land use right. A Chinese developer confirmed this
point with respect to Shanghai, but indicated that the practice differs in
Shenzhen, another booming real estate market. One law professor disagreed
with the lawyer, stating that developers are permitted to mortgage an unimproved land use right in order to obtain a loan for the development of the
structure to be built on that land. Perhaps that professor was recognizing that
such loans are legally permissible, without commenting on whether banks
Article 179 of the Property Rights Law define “mortgagor,” “mortgagee,” and “mortgaged property,” and the latter provision states that “if the debtor defaults, the creditor
shall have priority in satisfying his claim from such [mortgaged] property.” Wuquan
fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 179 (P.R.C.). See also id. art. 143 (“Except as otherwise provided for by law, the owner of the right to the use of land for
construction use shall have the right to transfer, exchange, make as capital contribution, donate or mortgage the right to the use of land for construction use.”); id. art.
170 (“Unless otherwise stipulated by laws, holder [sic] of security interest shall have
priority in satisfying its claim if a debtor defaults in its obligations.”).
Article 180 of the Property Rights Law lists seven different types of property
that may be mortgaged, including houses and land use rights, while article 34 of the
Guaranty Law lists six different types, with much overlap between the two groupings.
Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], art. 180; Danbao fa [Guaranty Law], art. 34.
Leaseholds are not specifically enumerated on either list and apparently are not mortgageable. See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 244-46 (discussing desirability of
permitting leasehold mortgages). Note again that “[i]n case of any discrepancy between the Guarantee [sic] Law of the People’s Republic of China and this [Property
Rights] Law, this Law shall prevail.” Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], art. 178.
Other types of mortgageable property include items that would be considered
personalty in the United States, and thus not subject to mortgage law. See, e.g., Danbao fa [Guaranty Law], art. 34(2), (4) (listing such items as “machines” and “means
of transport”). But note that separate chapters of the Property Rights Law and the
Guaranty Law address pledges. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], arts. 208-22 (addressing pledges of “movables”); Danbao fa [Guaranty Law], arts. 63-74 (same);
Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], arts. 223-29 (addressing pledges of “rights,” including commercial paper, securities, and intellectual property); Danbao fa [Guaranty
Law], arts. 75-81 (same).
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46

routinely grant them.
Or perhaps banks are willing to lend against a land
use right if the funds are to be used for construction, which means that the
value of the security will be increasing, but not if they are to be used for acquisition, where the value of the security remains constant. In the first of
these two cases, however, the lender presumably is receiving a mortgage on
the improvements and not just on the naked land use right.
These potentially inconsistent responses collectively suggest not just
that each professional’s experience with the application of these rules and
policies is different, but also that bank policies and government regulations
continue to evolve over time and vary from place to place within China. Frequent changes in the rules may reflect the degree to which the government
wishes to encourage or discourage development as the market matures, as
well as the accrual of experience over a relatively brief span of time. I was
told by one developer that it was possible several years ago for a developer to
function by mortgaging a land use right as security for the loan used to purchase that right, without contributing any of its own money. If this comment
is accurate, it suggests either that banks were willing to live with 100% loanto-value ratios at the time because the government was struggling to encourage private development or, perhaps, that government entities were selling
land use rights for less than their true fair market value.
In the current, overheated climate, mortgage loans that may once have
been available for developers to acquire land use rights appear to have become scarce, as state-controlled lenders try to cool the market gradually.
Banks may have come to the realization that they have been shouldering too
much development risk and now may be seeking to place more of this risk on
their borrowers. Note also that government entities that are selling land use
rights may impose their own requirements, on top of any applicable bank
limitations, as a means of slowing down the pace of development. To illustrate, one expert advised me that interested bidders now must deposit 30% of
the estimated value of the land use right with the government before they
qualify to bid on it.
Whether or not banks will extend loans secured by mortgages on undeveloped land use rights, they will lend for the construction of the building
47
Imitself and will insist on receiving a mortgage on the improvements.
provements are mortgageable, and a mortgage on an existing building auto48
This point
matically creates a mortgage on the underlying land use right.
46. There does not appear to be any legal prohibition on such a loan. Wuquan fa
[Property Rights Law], art. 180 (“The following property . . . may be mortgaged: . . .
(ii) Land use right to building lot . . . .”).
47. See RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15, at 247-48, 253-54 (discussing how
mortgages operate when securing future advances used to construct improvements).
See also supra Part III (discussing project loans).
48. See, e.g., Danbao fa [Guaranty Law], art. 36 (stating that mortgage on either
land use right or residential improvements on that land automatically creates mortgage on both). Cf. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], art. 200 (noting that mortgage
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further demonstrates that the Chinese land use right and the Western ground
49
lease function in quite distinct ways, despite some apparent similarities.
The ground lease allows the Western developer to operate without the need to
acquire fee title to the underlying land, so that the lease functions as a financing device. By contrast, the Chinese developer must purchase the underlying
land use right at the outset and, as just noted, may be unable to finance this
purchase. This distinction serves as a reminder that the principal purpose of
the Chinese land use right is to allow the Chinese government to sever official state ownership of the land from the private right to develop it. It also
reminds the Western observer yet again of the uneasy tension in China today
between the private right to develop property and the socialist conception of
50
common ownership of land.
When banks are considering whether to lend, they require the loan applicant to submit four documents: (1) the land certificate from the government, evidencing that the borrower is the holder of the land use right; (2) the
zone certificate, indicating that the height and bulk of the proposed building
51
comply with the requirements of the applicable architecture zone; (3) the
land zone certificate, demonstrating that the proposed use is permissible in
that land zone; and (4) the construction permit, which authorizes construc52
These documents are analogous to an American developer demontion.
strating that they hold title to the property, that their plans comply with all
applicable zoning laws, and that they have received a building permit. Although banks do technically require the submission of these four documents,
the first of these four – evidence of the land use right – is the most important
one to the lender. It is the land use right that will serve as security for the

on land that is subsequently improved does not create security interest in improvements and that, upon foreclosure, land and improvements may be sold together but
mortgagee shall receive none of proceeds attributable to improvements); Danbao fa
[Guaranty Law], art. 55 (same); Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Adminstration of Urban Real Estate] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 51 (P.R.C.) (suggesting that mortgage
on undeveloped land use right does not encumber home subsequently built on that
land). See also ZHONGZHI GAO, INVEST IN CHINA: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO REAL
ESTATE LAW 147 (2005) (“It is of practical use to distinguish mortgage of land from
mortgage of land and buildings on the land.”).
49. See supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 2 (highlighting these contradictions).
51. Interestingly, one experienced real estate developer told me that the obtaining
of this certificate in Shanghai requires the developer to demonstrate, among other
things, that the building contains defense facilities, such as underground tunnels, to be
used in the event of a war. In the alternative, the developer may pay a fee in lieu of
providing these facilities.
52. Note that different experts translated the names of these documents into
English in slightly different ways.
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repayment of the loan. In fact, some years ago, this submission was the only
one banks required.
Obtaining these four certificates, which are prerequisites for the receipt
of a project loan, requires significant cash outlays from the prospective borrower. One developer estimated that obtaining these four documents consumes roughly 30% of the typical development budget, with most of that
expense attributable to the cost of purchasing the land use right. The charge
for obtaining a land use right is even higher if it includes demolition and relocation expenses. These costs are passed along to the acquirer of the right by
the entity selling the right if the seller must remove structures and occupants
53
Since all or a
from the land, as is often the case in urban developments.
significant part of this money must be laid out before the developer is eligible
for a mortgage loan, it appears that current policies limit development to entities that are both well-capitalized and well-connected. Smaller entities
probably have tremendous difficulty raising the funds for these initial outlays,
and commercial lenders may not be willing or allowed to advance any portion
of these amounts.
One expert indicated that project lenders insist that a new building be at
least partially constructed before they will lend and accept a mortgage. If this
is a common practice, then developers must be in a position not just to acquire the land use right and the other necessary documentation, but also to
commence construction with their own funds. They will not be able to borrow any funds until the project is partly completed. The incomplete structure
then will serve as security for a loan of the funds needed to continue construction. This requirement increases still further the amount of equity the developer must raise before it is in a position to borrow any construction funds.
Loan-to-value ratios are an additional subject of discussion between developers and their lenders. Developers and lawyers suggested to me that a
typical loan-to-value ratio falls in the range of 50% to 80%. This is a term
the two parties may negotiate heavily, with more experienced and reliable
developers receiving relatively larger loans than their fledgling counter54
parts.
One small developer bemoaned her complete inability to procure bank
loans, because banks will not deal with a company so small. This developer
must finance construction entirely via equity, raising funds by selling shares
in her company. Even large developers, who are more likely to obtain conventional loans, decry the bureaucratic squabbles they must survive before
being able to proceed. One developer noted to me that in a typical project,
the developer must obtain 120 government “chops” (official seals), down
somewhat from 160 in earlier years. These government requirements are
53. See Stein, supra note 10, at 29-35.
54. See also INVESTMENT IN GREATER CHINA, supra note 30, at 309 (noting that
Shanghai’s regulations limit loan-to-value ratios to 80% of face value or net book
value or 90% of current cash value, depending on type of property).
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applied unevenly, however, and a lack of guanxi on the part of the builder
may lead to stricter-than-normal application of these rules to its project.
Developers also obtain significant funding from the eventual buyers of
the residential or commercial units in their projects. These entrepreneurs are
able to pre-sell residential units from promotional brochures and artists’ renderings in many of China’s white-hot urban areas. Huge buildings often sell
out in hours, before the developer has even broken ground. The consumer
will sign a purchase contract and put down a deposit, typically in the 20%
range. The buyer also must pay part of the remaining purchase price then or
soon afterwards, with this second payment often amounting to an additional
20- 30%. The developer will establish a payment schedule for delivery of the
remaining funds, with the final payment usually due before occupancy. One
consultant described buyers as receiving their key when they make the final
payment. If the developer breaches, the contract provides for contract remedies, which could turn out to be useless to the buyer if the project has failed.
But with the market generally humming, such breaches are not common, and
I was told that lenders often support developers who are struggling.
Buyers in this situation must produce some of their acquisition funds
when they sign the contract and the rest before the unit is complete. Yet most
buyers plan to borrow up to 80% of the money they will need to purchase
their unit, which appears to raise a cash-flow problem for most purchasers. If
they must pay for the unit before it is complete, they will need to come up
with all of the acquisition funds before they have the mortgageable asset their
lender is sure to demand. One agent indicated to me that when he bought his
own home, the bank was willing to lend him funds to pay for the unit before
it was completed, but he was never able to make clear to me what security the
lender received while the apartment was under construction. During this
fourteen-month period, however, the agent was making scheduled payments
on an incomplete apartment at the same time that he was continuing to pay
rent on his existing apartment. He acknowledged the risk and expense he
incurred but stated that he had no alternative if he wished to become a homeowner. The cost of financing one’s home while it is being built appears to be
55
part of the expense of buying a new residence in China.
55. Professors Randolph and Lou state that a purchaser in this situation “can
grant a mortgage on the pre-purchased property.” RANDOLPH & LOU, supra note 15,
at 246. This mortgage is recordable. Id. at 247. When the unit is completed, the
purchaser formally obtains the land use right from the developer and the mortgage is
re-registered to encumber the land use right. Id. Their statements pre-date the new
Property Rights Law by several years. Under the new law, a buyer may apply for
“pre-notice registration,” which serves as notice of the buyer’s interest in the property
prior to the official transfer of the land use right. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective
Oct. 1, 2007), art. 20 (P.R.C.). However, the buyer’s rights lapse if the transfer of the
land use right is not registered “within three (3) months from the date on which such
registration can be registered [sic].” Id. Moreover, lenders today will not lend to unit
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One expert told me that prospective buyers actually receive two ownership certificates from the developer, one signifying their ownership interest in
the underlying land use right and the second covering the unit. He claimed
that banks will accept a security interest in the first of these certificates even
before the residential unit is completed. The expert who advised me of this
practice noted that it is commonplace, but questioned whether it truly is legal
or enforceable. I was unable to confirm whether any such ownership certificate covering the land use right has any practical value: will a lender accept a
mortgage on this ownership right as security if it may not be able to enforce
that mortgage and if the lender is most likely junior in priority to the developer’s interest in the land use right and the new structure, both of which may
themselves have been mortgaged?
Two different experts told me that both the government and lenders
have begun to frown on pre-sales by developers, given the risk to the eventual
consumer that the seller will breach its contract and given the manner in
which these sales shift costs from the seller to the buyer. Both indicated that
developers now are prohibited from selling any units before receiving government approval, which will not be granted until the building is approxi56
mately 70% completed. A bank representative suggested that lenders, too,
have begun to discourage pre-sales that take place too early in the construction process, and that banks now may require that developers refrain from
selling units to the public until the outer skin of the building has been completed. Obviously, this will be an issue of great importance to a developer
that is trying to piece together the financing for a new project.
Contractors serve as another source of funds for developers. It is common practice for construction companies to undertake significant amounts of
construction and to pay for the building materials they have used long before
the developer pays them for their labor and reimburses them for their cash
outlays. Competition for work is sufficiently tight that contractors may not
receive their first payment until they have completed roughly one-third of the
work. Given that much of the labor for urban construction projects is furnished by migrant laborers who lack permits to serve as urban construction
buyers until a project is 80 percent complete. If developers continue to insist on presale consideration, they will create cash-flow problems for prospective buyers and
substantially reduce the pool of eligible buyers.
56. The Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate provides that new
homes may not be pre-sold until “[t]he funds put into the development construction
hav[e] reached twenty-five percent or more of the total investment for the construction project, computed on the basis of the commercial houses provided for presale,
and the schedule of construction and the date of completion for delivery hav[e] been
set,” but also states that the developer must obtain a “certificate of permission for the
presale of commercial houses” from the local government’s administrative department in charge of housing. Chengshi fangdichan guanli fa [Law on the Administration of Urban Real Estate] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong., July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995), art. 44(3)-(4) (P.R.C.).

189

1336

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72

workers, it seems likely that the contractors are passing these delays along to
their workers, slow-paying undocumented peasants who often do not speak
the local dialect and who are in no legal position to complain.
If a project fails, the contractor may never receive payment at all. Similarly, late payments from developers to contractors do not always bear interest. It is at least plausible to assume that contractors factor these risks into
their bids. Whether or not this is the case, contractors who are paid slowly
end up serving as another source of construction financing for the devel57
oper.
I was told that, in an attempt to slow the real estate market and protect
contractors, the government has recently prohibited the practice of using contractors as reluctant lenders. To the extent that these new rules have been
effective, developers must either begin the project with more money of their
own or borrow funds from other sources. Developers have found ways to
circumvent these limitations, however, and contractors have grudgingly gone
along. For example, the developer may sell an interest in the ownership entity to the contractor. Such a sale transforms the contractor from a creditor
entitled to payment into a minority co-owner that must contribute labor and
58
materials to the entity in return for its ownership stake.
Interestingly, several different experts informed me that there is no legal
mechanism in place in China for a lender to perfect a security interest in
rents. Borrowers may pledge the income stream from tenant rentals to their
lenders, but lenders have no way to perfect their security interest in this collateral. On new residential and commercial construction that will be sold
upon completion, this shortcoming is unlikely to have much relevance, since
there are no rent-paying tenants in possession and never will be. Nonetheless,
these experts expressed frustration with this gap in Chinese real estate practice. It seems likely that China will have to permit this type of perfection at
some future time.

V. LENDING STANDARDS
Although banks do require the submission of certain documents before
59
they will extend credit, such as the income statement noted above, few of
the experts I met expressed much confidence in lenders’ internal financial
lending requirements. From their perspective, the only preconditions of any
significance to lenders are those that are imposed to ensure that the project is
57. By contrast, in a typical American construction loan, the developer pays the
contractor on a monthly basis, one month in arrears, and often holds back 5-10% of
the amount due as a retainage. The developer borrows the bulk of these funds from
its construction lender. Interest on the ever-growing construction loan balance accrues on a monthly basis and compounds.
58. Stein, supra note 10, at 20-21.
59. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
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legally permissible and socially desirable. Banks appear to make the decision
to lend based solely on the legality of the project and the government’s wish
to see the project proceed and are far less concerned with the financial viability of the completed development. When I asked one American expert who
works in China whether Chinese developers gathered data or prepared feasibility studies for proposed new projects, he laughingly replied, “A lot of these
buildings were just built.” He did concede that this approach has changed
recently, with some banks adopting lending standards more familiar to Westerners.
This lack of concern with “the numbers” of a given project may reflect
inexperience relative to Western institutions, though one would think that
lenders would develop that sort of expertise relatively quickly. More likely, it
is a reminder that nearly all banks in China are state-owned or statecontrolled, unlike typical Western lenders. The government uses the banking
system as an instrument of social policy, subsidizing construction of politically desirable projects even if those projects are not otherwise financially
viable.
Many Westerners today view the modern Chinese economy as moving
quickly toward capitalism, but one Westerner with significant experience in
China’s real estate market described China’s economy to me as “the farthest
thing from a free market you can get without being centrally planned.” This
odd combination of lenders that are charged with advancing specific government ends and developers that seek to maximize profits and returns while
minimizing risks leads to outcomes that differ in important ways from those
seen in Western real estate markets.
One expert suggested that developers actually prepare two feasibility
studies at the outset of their projects, a bare-bones form for the lender, providing evidence that all legal hurdles have been cleared and that the project is
viewed as politically necessary, and a more realistic one for internal consumption only, demonstrating that the development actually will be profitable. A second speaker, who was extremely knowledgeable about China’s
banking system, advised me that the banks themselves also have two different
sets of standards. As a starting point, all banks must comply with guidelines
imposed by government agencies charged with bank oversight. In addition,
each bank’s board of directors sets internal credit policies for that bank, and
these internal policies are likely to be more stringent than the bare minimum
levels established by banking regulators. One real estate developer argued
that banks actually take the decision whether to lend quite seriously, hiring
experts to analyze the property, having the land surveyed, and undertaking
research as to the strength of the market.
Another real estate specialist, discussing the rapid early development of
the Pudong New Area in Shanghai, commented that for publicly desirable
projects in that zone, banks were required to lend. In contrast, for projects
offering an entirely private benefit, developers had to negotiate with banks
individually to obtain loans. Private projects that the government saw as having significant public benefit could always count on receiving a green light
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60

from their state-supported lender. This approach presumably enhances the
municipal bottom line for jurisdictions that are attempting to upgrade and
modernize quickly, since ostensibly private projects with significant public
benefit will not look as if they were built with any direct outlay of government money. The solvency of the government-controlled bank that has been
forced to underwrite a quasi-public improvement that will not produce ade61
quate cash flow is another story.
There is a more benign explanation for the fact that real estate loans do
not seem to be evaluated on the basis of the economic viability of the project.
The short history of the post-Mao real estate market has been one of steadily
appreciating real estate values, and most real estate loans have been successfully repaid. Under this explanation, the banks initially adopted a rather
short-sighted view of the lending process, and their over-optimism has been
repeatedly rewarded ever since. To the extent that banks are accurately assessing projects at all, they may be willing to make risky loans in the belief –
supported by all of their recent experience – that the project will appreciate
rapidly and the borrower will repay the loan. Several speakers acknowledged
that China’s banks face serious problems arising from nonperforming loans
but argued that most of those loans were made to enterprises engaged in businesses other than real estate. Some obsolete state-owned manufacturing enterprises possess few assets of value that an unpaid lender can pursue. Real
estate borrowers, by contrast, have pledged to their lenders an asset that is
both valuable and appreciating.
If this explanation is true, developers will be sure to keep paying their
loans even if their debts currently exceed the value of their assets, because
they have faith that the project soon will increase in value and be “in the
black.” This view is bolstered by most of China’s recent history, which for
the Chinese real estate market is the only history that exists. We can expect
China to learn from tough experience at some point in the future, when the
inevitable pullback occurs.
Note as well that many of the experts I met focused their discussions on
the booming residential markets. Since residential units generally are sold
upon completion (if not sooner), the developers recoup their investments
quickly, pay off their loans, and move on to the next project. New residential
60. The government also uses its control over the transfer of land use rights as a
means of directing specific uses toward (or away from) specific districts. See Peter
T.Y. Cheung, Guangzhou and Tianjin: The Struggle for Development in Two Chinese
Cities, in CITIES IN CHINA: RECIPES FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN THE REFORM
ERA 18, 46-47 (Jae Ho Chung ed., 1999). Shanghai’s government apparently used
this power to centralize the foreign banking industry in the Pudong New Area. Id.
(noting that “foreign banks have to set up their branches or headquarters in Pudong
first if they would like to be given the authority to carry out renminbi business in the
future”). See also Stein, supra note 10, at 25 (making similar point about Pudong’s
foreign banks and international schools).
61. See infra Part VII.
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owners have so much on the line – including, often, the residence and life
savings of themselves, their parents, and their grandparents – that they will
find some way to pay off their acquisition loan. Commercial developments
may fare differently. In these settings, the owner may hold the project for a
longer time for investment income, and the owner’s ability to repay a mortgage loan depends on the receipt of a reliable flow of tenant rents.
One real estate expert provided a more worrisome explanation for the
lack of connection between creditworthiness and credit availability. In this
speaker’s view, the government and its banks help favored candidates invest
in real estate. This speaker’s implication – not stated outright – is that a successful project will indirectly redound to the benefit of the bank officials who
agreed to fund it. Banks lend to favored developers, who surreptitiously reward the decision-makers. While this expert did not directly accuse bank
officers of corruption, one real estate professional did tell me, “Law is for the
honest people. Like you and me. They restrict people like you and me.” The
first real estate expert was more optimistic about the future, however, noting
that behavior of this type is becoming less common as the market matures
and grows more internationalized, as key lenders consider public offerings of
their shares, as the government struggles to slow down a very hot real estate
market, and as the government and the public become more attuned to the
difficulties that institutionalized government graft can cause.
More generally, lending officers at state-owned banks face institutional
incentives that do not always lead to the maximization of profits. In Western
nations, bank profitability may translate into bonuses for key loan officers
while bank losses may send these same officers to the unemployment line.
Those who make credit decisions have a direct personal interest in the success
or failure of their employers’ projects. But Chinese banks are state-owned
and must satisfy government policymakers rather than shareholders who demand transparency and profits.
One real estate consultant explained to me that banks assign a lending
quota to each of their lending officers and that the officers’ bonuses depend
solely on meeting these targets. Employees are not rewarded for making
good lending decisions or penalized for making poor ones. The pressure
simply is to lend, and there is little linkage between the fate of the bank and
the fate of those who work for the bank. If loans become troubled as the project progresses, similar incentives come into play. There is no reason for a
state-owned bank to concede that an earlier lending decision was a poor one;
rather, the bank is likely to lend still more money to keep the project afloat. It
is easy to avoid the negative publicity of acknowledging a bad loan when the
bank’s money supply is essentially unlimited and no one ever gets to see the
books.
Opaque procedures that encourage speedy development may have been
exactly what China needed in the 1980s and 1990s, as a rapidly evolving
government nurtured a new market in real estate. But the government has
become concerned that today’s markets are dangerously overheated and has
taken steps to slow the market as gently as possible. For example, the pre-
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vailing rate on home mortgage loans was raised to 6.93% in 2007 in an effort
62
to cool the residential market. Some banks charge higher rates on loans to
purchase second homes, presumably on the theory that the luxury investment
market needs to be restrained to a greater extent than does the market in
owner-occupied primary residences. Banks also have increased the minimum
down payment from 20% to 30%, with some banks charging even more.
For the same reason, the government has imposed several new taxes and
63
In
raised rates on some existing taxes that affect the real estate market.
addition, some units of government have become more inclined to enforce the
requirement that the initial holder of a land use right build on the property
within two years. Until recently, that standard term had been routinely ig64
While neither of these recent changes directly affects the relationnored.
ship between borrower and lender, both are manifestations of the government’s desire to keep appreciation of real estate prices in check and both suggest that there will be further tightening in lending standards.
The government also seems worried that ordinary citizens who invest
their nest eggs in real estate could suffer dramatic losses if real estate prices
65
drop precipitously. Chinese law provides for a foreclosure right similar to
66
the one available in the United States, which means that a real estate recession might cause many new homeowners to lose their recently purchased
62. Interest rates generally have climbed during the past several years, from
4.12% (with government workers entitled to a reduced rate of 3.58%) to 5.27%, then
to 5.51%, and then to 6.12%, before settling at the 2007 rate of 6.93%. See Li Xinran,
Fixed-Rate Mortgage Suspended as Interest Rate Raised, SHANGHAIDAILY.COM, May
22, 2007, http://www.shanghaidaily.com/sp/article/2007/200705/20070522/article_
316770.htm. Published sources do not provide consistent confirmation of these rates,
and different banks sometimes charge different rates. See, e.g., Major Banks Confirm
New Property Loan Rates, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE, Mar. 22, 2005,
http://english.people.com.cn/200503/22/eng20050322_177819.html.
63. The government, for example, charges a new 1.5% transfer tax. Additional
taxes apply to larger apartments, which are defined as those that exceed a baseline of
120 square meters (about 1,270 square feet) by more than 20%. In addition, the government implemented a new 5.5% tax on gains if an owner sells property within one
year of purchasing it. These recent changes demonstrate the government’s inclination
to restrain the market.
64. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
65. The individual right to invest is specifically protected under the new Property
Rights Law. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 65 (P.R.C.) (“The
legal savings, investment and returns of individuals shall be protected by law.”).
Investment performance, of course, is subject to the vagaries of an unsettled and rapidly developing market.
66. Id. arts. 195-200; Danbao fa [Guaranty Law] (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 30, 1995, effective Oct. 1, 1995), arts. 53-58
(P.R.C.). See generally Whitman, supra note 10, at 65-79 (comparing American and
Chinese foreclosure processes).
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dwellings. Article 195 of the Property Rights Law, for example, provides
that an unpaid lender “may, through agreement with the mortgagor, be paid
out of the proceeds from the conversion of the mortgaged property or from
the auction or sale of the mortgaged property,” or else the lender may bring
67
suit. Article 198 states that a foreclosed mortgagor retains the excess of the
sale proceeds over the balance of the debt but remains responsible for paying
68
any shortfalls, and the following section clarifies the rights of junior lend69
ers. Despite the government’s concerns, one banker informed me that the
default rate by homebuyers still is only about 1.5%, a fact that likely reflects
70
the ever-increasing value of residential real estate. Similarly, a commercial
developer indicated that the default rate on commercial property held for
rental income is very low.

VI. SOURCES OF FUNDS: LENDERS AND THE GOVERNMENT
The amount of construction in China is shocking and is one of the first
things a Western visitor notices. A half-century of pent-up demand is being
met in a decade or two by a nation whose citizens want to make China’s presence known to the world. To some extent, this requires large outlays of government funds, particularly for the building of infrastructure. Nonetheless,
71
many new projects are being built and financed privately. This raises a key
question: where do the banks in a rapidly developing but still poor nation
come up with the funds their borrower clients are demanding? Or, stated
more bluntly, where is all this money coming from?
Much of the money seems to come from the savings of China’s 1.4 billion citizens. Along with its huge population, China has a very high savings
rate, estimated to be in the range of forty percent; by contrast, the savings rate
72
Until recently, there were few consumer
in the United States is 0.8%.
67. Wuquan fa [Property Rights Law], art. 195.
68. Id. art. 198.
69. Id. art. 199.
70. In the fourth quarter of 2006, the default rate in the United States increased to
4.95%. Press Release, Mortgage Bankers Association, Delinquencies and Foreclosures Increase in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Mar. 13, 2007),
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/50974.htm. For subprime loans, the rate increased to 13.33%. Id.
71. Keep in mind that the term “private” can have a very different meaning in
China. Entities that are developing real estate may be state-owned or state-controlled,
and the same is true for the lenders that finance their projects. My use of the term
“private” covers the range from truly private entities, including those owned at least
in part by non-Chinese, to government-influenced entities – both developers and
lenders – that are attempting to operate somewhat like private businesses.
72. A recent China Daily article estimated that Chinese spend only about 60
percent of their income. Zhang Ran, Personal Savings Hit Record US$1.7 Trillion,
CHINA DAILY, Jan. 17, 2006, at 1, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/
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goods on which Chinese citizens could spend their disposable income, and
even now many Chinese appear to be saving as much as they can in case the
future is not as bright as the present. Chinese parents generally may have
only one child, which means that families, and thus child-rearing expenses,
73
The lack of a comprehensive social security system
are relatively small.
combined with the knowledge that a child without siblings may end up supporting two parents and four grandparents has encouraged some fairly frenzied savings. Meanwhile, the average family in China, particularly in urban
areas in the eastern part of the nation, is quickly becoming much wealthier.
So the amount of private savings potentially available for lending continues
to grow.
Families that wish to invest for the future have limited choices about
where to place their savings, and bank accounts seem to be one of the few
safe alternatives. Banks, however, pay a low interest rate of 0.72% on sav74
ings accounts, which means that Chinese savers will not get rich placing
their savings in the bank. The nation’s nascent stock markets in Shenzhen
and Shanghai have been plagued by volatility, and many people still view the
stock market with great apprehension. Overseas investment opportunities are
75
So for the
virtually nonexistent in a nation with strict currency controls.
doc/2006-01/17/content_512872.htm. The personal savings rate in the United States
during the third quarter of 2007 was 0.8%. BUREAU OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP’T
OF COMMERCE, NATIONAL ECONOMIC ACCOUNTS, PERSONAL SAVINGS RATE, available at http://www.bea.gov/briefrm/saving.htm (last updated Aug. 30, 2007). Comparisons of this type can be misleading. Americans are more likely than Chinese to
be able to rely on income sources that may not be reflected in the savings rate, including future social security benefits; pre-tax savings accounts such as 401(k) plans and
IRAs; capital gains; and home appreciation. See, e.g., Milt Marquis, What’s Behind
the Low U.S. Personal Saving Rate?, FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER (Federal Reserve
Bank of San Francisco), No. 2002-09, Mar. 29, 2002, at 1, available at
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2002/el2002-09.pdf (noting ways
in which measurements of US savings rate are incomplete).
73. Note, however, that some Chinese breadwinners are supporting aging parents
as well.
74. Bank of China currently pays 0.72% interest on renminbi demand deposits,
with somewhat higher rates available for lump-sum deposits committed for fixed time
periods. Bank of China, RMB Deposit Rates, http://www.bank-of-china.com/en/
common/rmbdeposit.jsp?category=1099376639100 (last visited June 7, 2007). One
consultant advised me that a typical Chinese bank earns 60% of its income from the
spread between the interest rate the bank receives from its borrowers and the much
lower interest rate the bank pays to its depositors.
75. See Janet Ong, China May Ease Rules on Investing Overseas, INT’L HERALD
TRIB., Sept. 22, 2004, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2004/09/22/
bloomberg/sxchina.php (noting that “China bans its citizens from buying stocks
abroad to prevent an exodus of foreign reserves,” while also recognizing that China
must comply with World Trade Organization rules and must provide its citizens with
adequate investment options).
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typical Chinese investor, real estate and low-rate interest-bearing savings
accounts seem to be the safest options. Many invest in both. As a result,
Chinese banks are well-stocked with funds to lend, and Chinese citizens have
been competing aggressively to find real estate in which to invest.
In fact, one of the reasons supplied to me most regularly for the success
of residential real estate markets in certain Chinese cities is the lack of alternative investment vehicles for the typical citizen. Savings accounts pay
minimal interest, the erratic stock exchanges are viewed with intense suspicion, and apartments are appreciating at an enormous, if unsustainable, rate.
So every Chinese saver wants to buy an apartment now and sell it within a
few months, in the hope that the crash will not occur until the month after
that. Many of the people I spoke with, never having experienced a prolonged
price drop in a relatively free market, do not appear to believe that a real estate crash will ever occur, or they acknowledge the possibility without seeming to recognize the practical effects it would have on them and on their nation.
One real estate developer claimed that the government simply prints
money and supplies it to the banks as needed. Elementary macroeconomic
theory suggests that this approach, if followed to any material extent, would
lead to inflation. I heard several anecdotal complaints that prices in China
have been on the rise, but inflation does not appear to have been a widespread
problem in China during the past several years (outside of the residential real
estate markets in prime locations!). However, it is difficult to know exactly
how much inflation there truly is in a nation where the market remains so
heavily controlled by the government.
Even if the government is not increasing the money supply as a means
of meeting borrowers’ demands or supporting insolvent financial institutions,
it may well be using existing government revenues for those purposes. If this
is the case – a plausible theory in a nation with numerous state-owned banks
that are reportedly insolvent – then the government is simply serving as an
indirect lender. Instead of spending its tax receipts and other revenues directly on infrastructure or other development, the Chinese government could
be using some of those same revenues to support banks that lend for these
same purposes without any realistic prospect of being repaid. Chinese citizens thus may be supporting China’s banks indirectly, by paying taxes to a
government that dispenses some of these revenues to banks for lending to real
estate developers, and directly, by placing significant private savings in those
same banks.
Another possible explanation is that China’s favorable trade imbalance
with Western nations, particularly the United States, provides indirect funding to China’s lending institutions. Manufacturing facilities raise huge
amounts of cash by selling their wares to American consumers. These manufacturers may be saving some of their money in China’s banks, where the
funds are available to be lent to real estate developers. And since many of
these manufacturers are owned at least in part by the same Chinese state that
controls these banks, the government is essentially a huge entrepreneur. This
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giant manufacturing company, with hundreds of millions of employees, is
diversifying its portfolio by reinvesting its profits from its primary manufacturing business into real estate loans in Shanghai, some of which it knows and
76
expects will never be repaid.
The question of where the banks get their money ultimately is inseparable from the question of where the Chinese government obtains its money,
because the banks are government-owned and the government is supporting
the nation’s real estate boom. Perhaps the best and most complete answer to
this key pair of questions was the one supplied to me by a forthright government official. I asked this man the more general question of how the Chinese
real estate market has been able to perform so well so rapidly, particularly
when compared to corresponding markets in other developing nations. He
supplied three cogent answers, with the first of the three being the most notable.
As this gentleman delicately stated, the primary source of financial support for China’s government, and thus for its lending institutions, is “our ancestors,” by which he meant prior generations of Chinese. The Chinese government currently owns all the land in the nation aside from land owned by
agricultural collectives, and the government retains the power to requisition
agricultural land whenever it chooses. It nationalized the land it owns over
the course of roughly three decades, usually paying the prior owners of the
77
In the early rounds of
land little or nothing in the way of compensation.
these condemnations, rural landlords were the principal targets, but by the
1970s, the government was taking the remaining private urban land.
Today, the Chinese government supports its operations in large part by
selling off land use rights in this same land, often to the same types of real
estate professionals who were the primary targets of uncompensated nationalization during Mao’s time. There are currently no ad valorem property
taxes in China, so unlike American jurisdictions at the city and county level,
China cannot depend on a steady stream of revenues flowing from a stable
78
real property tax base. China relies instead on income taxes, real property
transfer taxes, and, most significantly, proceeds from the sale of long term

76. For a discussion of China’s plans for investing its “immense reserves of
foreign currency,” see Jim Yardley & David Barboza, China to Open Fund to Invest
Currency Reserves, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2007, at C3. See also Keith Bradsher, Dollars to Spare In China’s Trove, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at C1 (addressing China’s
foreign investments).
77. For the most part, these seizures were uncompensated. But see RANDOLPH &
LOU, supra note 15, at 9-11 (discussing history of land nationalization since 1949 and
noting disagreement among Chinese scholars as to when this process was completed).
78. Collection of income taxes appears to be problematic in an economy so heavily reliant on cash and in which so many people appear to have gray-market income.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text. I witnessed a large public rally, complete
with a uniformed brass band, encouraging citizens to pay their income taxes.
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rights to use the same land that the government requisitioned between 1949
and 1982.
Stated more directly, the Chinese government is funding its operations
in significant part by selling to private parties land that it previously seized
from other private parties. Putting aside the irony that the Chinese government came to power promising to reduce the harmful influence of landlords
and now is supporting itself by selling these landlords’ former holdings to
real estate developers, this method of raising funds creates long-term structural problems for government operations.
To begin with, different levels of government in China have become
participants in and beneficiaries of the current real estate boom, and not just
referees or superintendents of it. The urban population is growing and
China’s citizens are demanding higher living standards, so municipal governments must ensure that housing and infrastructure continue to improve in
both quality and quantity. Municipal governments such as Shanghai depend
on the revenues from the regular sale of land use rights and are in the best
position to fund this continued growth and modernization if real estate values
keep appreciating. Their participatory role in the real estate market places
these government entities in direct conflict with the central government,
which wants to maintain social order by ensuring that residential real estate
remains affordable and that the gap between the haves and the have-nots does
not grow too large.
The central government, in other words, must ensure that Shanghai, Inc.,
which holds huge tracts of very valuable real estate, does not act in a way that
is harmful to the nation as a whole. For example, the central government has
established quotas for the amount of land that can be converted from agricultural-collective ownership to government ownership, which is a prerequisite
to the sale of land use rights in agricultural land by municipal governments.
This national limit both slows real estate development on the outskirts of
79
urban areas and reduces the amount of land that is lost to agricultural use.

79. The central government appears to be concerned about the loss of farmland
for two distinct reasons. First, it wants to ensure that China remains capable of feeding itself. See George C.S. Lin & Samuel P.S. Ho, China’s Land Resources and Land
Use Change, in EMERGING LAND AND HOUSING MARKETS IN CHINA, supra note 9, at
89, 116 (suggesting that China’s land resources will not remain adequate for its growing population). Second, it wants to avoid the social upheaval that would be associated with a massive and rapid relocation of tens or hundreds of millions of peasants
who migrate to urban areas because they have lost their land, along with the dignity
(and retirement security) that farming provides. See PEERENBOOM, supra note 7, at
482 (noting prevalence of land disputes).
So, for example, the Land Administration Law states, “Overall plans for land
utilization shall be drawn up in accordance with the following principles: (1) strictly
protecting the capital farmland and keeping land for agriculture under control lest it
should be occupied and used for non-agricultural construction.” Tudi guanli fa [Land
Administration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
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These municipalities have great incentives to sell the most desirable land
first, and to sell off land at a rate that is too rapid to be sustainable over the
long term. Downtown property is being cleared of run-down residential and
commercial buildings, some of which have not seen any maintenance in more
80
than half a century. This land commands the highest price in the market for
land use rights, suggesting that sales of less central land in future years will
generate lower prices on an inflation-adjusted, per-square-meter basis. The
government thus will have to sell larger and larger tracts faster and faster if it
hopes to continue to feed its habit of operating off the proceeds of sales of
land use rights. Governments that maintain their solvency by selling off a
finite natural resource tend to mine the most accessible ore first. Their remaining assets are less valuable and may run out altogether.
Land use rights last for forty, fifty, or seventy years, depending on the
purpose for which they are conveyed, and the government receives the entire
81
fee for the sale of the land use right at the time of the initial conveyance. It
is entirely possible that the government will dispose of the right to use all of
the most desirable land well before the first round of land use rights begins to
expire. Recall that the current system of transferrable land use rights has
June 25, 1986, revised Dec. 29, 1988, Aug. 29, 1998 & Aug. 28, 2004, effective Aug.
28, 2004), art. 19 (P.R.C.). Further, when planning what land is to be used for urban
construction, “[a]ttention shall be paid to making full use of the existing land earmarked for construction and using little or no land earmarked for agriculture.” Id. art.
22. The new Property Rights Law states, “[t]he State adopts special protection with
regard to the agriculture land, strictly limiting the transfer of agriculture land to construction land so as to control the total quantity of the construction land.” Wuquan fa
[Property Rights Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Mar. 16, 2007, effective Oct. 1, 2007), art. 43 (P.R.C.). Expropriation of “basic farmland” requires approval by the State Council. Tudi guanli fa [Land Administration
Law], art. 45. See generally id. arts. 31-42 (addressing protection of cultivated land).
Note also that those who illegally convert cultivated land to other uses are
subject to criminal prosecution. Xing fa [Criminal Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 1, 1979, revised Mar. 14, 1997, Dec. 25, 1999,
Aug. 31, 2001, Dec. 29, 2001, Dec. 28, 2002, Feb. 28, 2005 & June 29, 2006, effective June 29, 2006), art. 342 (P.R.C.) (authorizing punishments for violation that include imprisonment, detention, and fines).
80. It is hard to argue that some of these marginally habitable structures merit
preservation. But the occupants of these structures receive compensation that reflects
the low value of these units. This guarantees that there will continue to be massive
residential relocation within major metropolitan areas, as poorer downtown residents
use their compensation to purchase newer units in less costly outlying areas, while
middle-class Chinese spend their newfound wealth on downtown apartments. See
Stein, supra note 10, at 31-32. This process guarantees the destruction of many older
urban communities, along with their vibrant street life. For an excellent discussion of
Chinese condemnation issues, see Chenglin Liu, Informal Rules, Transaction Costs,
and the Failure of the “Takings” Law in China, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV.
1 (2005).
81. See supra notes 22, 27 and accompanying text.

2007]

MORTGAGE LAW IN CHINA

1347

existed only since the late 1980s and that sales of land use rights did not begin in earnest until a few years later, which means that most land use rights
still have many years to run. This suggests that the government will have to
wean itself of its addiction to these sale proceeds at some point before the
82
first round of land use rights begins to expire. The problem is not just that
the land that is left in ten or twenty years will be less desirable, it is also that
there may not be any marketable land left by then at all.
If the government discovers that it has run out of marketable land before
a substantial number of land use rights expire, its only alternative will be to
locate new funding sources, such as additional taxes, an approach that is
likely to be as unpopular in China as it is anywhere else. Even when land use
rights do begin to expire in significant numbers, Chinese law is unclear as to
whether these rights must be renewed upon expiration of their initial term and
whether the holder must pay an additional fee to the government if the holder
83
So even if China does budget the redoes have automatic renewal rights.
maining land judiciously, it will not necessarily be able to raise additional
funds by renewing or reconveying land use rights a couple of decades from
now.
The Chinese government official who spoke so openly about China’s reliance on the sale of land it had previously nationalized offered two additional
reasons why China’s real estate market has grown so quickly. Bond financing has stimulated Chinese real estate development, although this official
indicated that the amount of bond financing is relatively small. In addition,
“our own income” has been beneficial, by which he was referring to the frequent use of Build-Operate-Transfer (“BOT”) financing.
In a typical BOT deal, a private entity is authorized to build a public
project, such as a toll road or a bridge. The private entity is permitted to operate the project for a specified period of time, perhaps twenty years, so that it
can recoup its costs and earn a profit through the imposition of user fees, such
as tolls. At the end of the stated time period, the project reverts to govern84
In a similar way, private entities that agree to construct
ment control.
82. This discussion assumes that the holders of land use rights will have to pay to
extend them. If the government is required to grant these extensions without charge
(an option that, from today’s perspective, seems not to be feasible), then the government’s problems will be even more dire. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying
text.
83. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. Presumably, if an existing
land use right expires and the right to use the same land then is transferred to a different holder, that new holder would have to pay a new fee for this land use right, reflecting its market value at the time of the renewal.
84. Essentially, this structure differs little from a twenty-year land use right with
no renewal option. For an American example, see J.K. Wall, Public-Private Funding
Model for Indiana Toll Road Gains Speed, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Nov. 15, 2006 (discussing proposed 75-mile toll road in Indiana to be financed privately and leased to
private operator for 75 years).
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quasi-public facilities may be awarded desirable land use rights nearby. In
effect, they are being paid in kind for their provision of a public facility. One
real estate expert stated that these types of projects initially became popular in
Hong Kong and have spread from there to the mainland. In Shanghai, the
Xintiandi historic preservation project apparently has run at a loss since its
inception, but the developer that renovated Xintiandi also received valuable
land use rights to neighboring downtown land.
It thus appears that most of the loan financing and other financial support available to real estate developers in China has been borrowed or seized
from past, present, and future generations of Chinese. Past generations involuntarily supplied their land to the government, which now is selling it off at
an enormous profit. The land is a necessary input for real estate developers,
while the sale proceeds are essential to government units struggling to provide vital services to a huge population. Today’s Chinese are placing their
savings in banks that lend to developers and also are paying taxes that are
used directly to furnish new infrastructure and indirectly to support insolvent
banks. They also may be paying somewhat higher prices for goods if the
government is, in fact, meeting currency shortfalls by simply printing more of
it. Future generations of Chinese may pay the rest of the bill if they contribute higher taxes years from now, if they otherwise provide the funds that the
government will need to repay its obligations, and if they must renew their
expiring land use rights at unexpectedly high prices.

VII. THE STABILITY OF THE CHINESE BANKING SECTOR
Most banks operating in China are owned or controlled by the Chinese
government, and these banks’ lending decisions are more likely to reflect
85
official government policy than astute business judgment. This unusual set
of motivations causes the Western observer to wonder whether China’s banks
are financially viable. Since the competition facing the typical Chinese bank
is almost entirely domestic, and thus responsive to the same internal political
stimuli, China’s banks appear to have little to fear from their local competitors. The same non-business factors that cause one bank to make a poor
business decision likely cause that bank’s rivals to make similarly poor business decisions. Every Chinese bank is wearing the same pair of weighted
shoes.
A bank also is a business, however. It collects money from its borrowers, who are paying interest on their loans, and must pay interest to its own
depositors from these collections. If China’s banks make too many loans that
are financially unwise, then at some point they may become insolvent. The
government may be able to sustain these banks temporarily with infusions of
funds – these banks are, after all, instruments of state policy and can be kept

85. See supra Part V.

2007]

MORTGAGE LAW IN CHINA

1349
86

afloat with general operating revenues from the government.
But if huge,
money-losing banks are on China’s balance sheet, they could become an
enormous drain on China’s economy.
As previously noted, China has an astronomical savings rate, and many
of China’s savers place some of their money in interest-bearing bank ac87
counts. While the rate banks pay on savings accounts is relatively low, the
enormous amount of money currently on deposit in China creates an extremely large interest burden and places great pressure on Chinese banks to
lend out their deposits at a higher rate. The larger the proportion of nonperforming loans, the greater the pressure banks feel to ensure that the rest of
their portfolios perform adequately.
This business pressure is compounded by the government’s continuing
insistence on funding projects that it deems worthy. The financial demands
of depositors combined with the policy mandates of the government make it
imperative that China’s banks lend briskly. This probably explains why loan
officers must meet lending quotas based on volume rather than on the ulti88
mate success or failure of the projects being funded. Several different experts confirmed that the modus operandi of Chinese banks seems to be to lend
first and worry later. When I asked one lawyer how the system manages to
work, he replied, “As long as the economy keeps growing . . . .”
Estimates of the proportion of nonperforming loans vary. I frequently
heard knowledgeable experts – several affiliated with Chinese banks – state
that 30-40% of loans held by Chinese banks are nonperforming. One bank
attorney told me that the official estimate is in the 20-23% range. A Western
attorney advised me that one of his clients, who purchases nonperforming
loans from Chinese financial institutions, believes a more accurate number
would fall in the 40-50% range. A Chinese expert summarized the issue
more tersely: all banks in China are insolvent. Nearly every expert agreed
that the four leading Chinese banks, which control a huge segment of the
lending market, are insolvent. Another Chinese banker denied the existence
of the problem altogether.
In an effort to address the problem of nonperforming loans, the Chinese
government recently established four asset-management companies. The four
largest banks in China have been transferring the weakest loans in their portfolios to these asset-management companies, thereby improving the financial
stability of the transferor banks. It is widely believed that these transfers
were consummated as a precursor to public offerings of the stock of the four
banks. These transfers do not solve anything, of course; they simply shift the
nonperforming loans to the four new government-controlled entities. To the
extent the government must bail out its ailing financial sector, only the form
of the problem has changed. Instead of supporting four banks with large
86. See infra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
88. See supra p. 1339.
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numbers of nonperforming loans, the government now must support the four
asset-management companies instead.
Several experts informed me that the asset-management companies are
attempting to sell some of these nonperforming loans to foreign banks at discounts of up to 80%. If this is so, then the overseas buyers are gambling that
they will be able to recover at least a percentage of the face value of these
debts. The Chinese government, meanwhile, is capping and liquidating its
losses on these loans, giving up the slim possibility of recovering all of the
loan proceeds down the road and receiving instead a small but certain payoff
now. By disposing of these loans at such a steep discount, the government is
indirectly subsidizing the banks’ earlier poor lending decisions, many of
which were made under government pressure to fund projects the government
deemed meritorious.
One way or another, the government – though not necessarily the same
arm of the government – is footing part of the bill for unwise decisions made
by Chinese lenders in the past. The net expense differs little from the price
the government might have paid had it funded some of these projects directly
89
When a bank suffers a loss in China, that stateor even built them itself.
owned entity is indirectly passing these costs along to the entire population.
The ultimate sources of these funds are the same as those noted earlier, and
include income tax revenues, transfer tax revenues, sales of land use rights,
bond financing, and user fees and tolls. It therefore is critically important to
China that the current real estate boom, which serves as the wellspring for
many of these revenue streams, continues.
Several real estate experts, while acknowledging the problems facing
China’s banking sector, argued that the banks’ problems do not arise from
real estate loans. Real estate developers nearly always pay their loans. Most
of their projects, particularly residential developments, are sold upon completion, so the developers retire their debts quickly and move on to the next project. The buyers, meanwhile, generally are owner-occupants or investors, and
they are able either to make their mortgage payments or to flip the properties
quickly and at a profit. These experts claim that as long as real estate prices
continue to increase, the rate of nonperforming real estate loans is likely to
remain small.
All of these experts seemed dismissive of the idea that real estate prices
might ever drop precipitously, a phenomenon unknown in the modern iteration of the Chinese real estate market. If such an event were to occur,
89. Note that one governmental entity may be profiting at the expense of another.
For example, a municipal government may have benefited from the construction of a
factory that, while unsuccessful overall, employs numerous local residents and reduces the local government’s burden of supporting them. If the lender that holds a
loan to that company that has become non-performing opts to sell this loan to an asset-management company rather than seeking to enforce it, the state-supported lender
and the state-supported asset-management company share the ultimate loss, while the
municipal government entity continues to enjoy the benefit.
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China’s lenders might suffer even more than they already have, because of
their earlier failures to make credit decisions based on a mortgagor’s actual
capacity to repay. Such a development, however painful in the short term,
might eventually lead to the growth of a more mature residential lending industry, with loan decisions based on an applicant’s actual salary, job history,
and credit record.
The true sources of the banks’ bad loans, according to these experts, are
state-owned enterprises, foreign joint ventures, and wholly foreign-owned
90
enterprises. While the gargantuan non-real-estate problems facing China’s
banking system are well beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting
that the Chinese government has significant reasons to ensure that many of
these loans continue to be repaid, even if it means using general tax revenues
for the repayments. Some of the companies that might otherwise collapse are
high-profile Chinese brand names, and it could shatter confidence in the
emerging Chinese market, both at home and abroad, if the government were
to allow a well-known company to fail. China has at least as much interest in
ensuring the survival of some if its banner companies as the United States had
in bailing out Chrysler or United Airlines.
More critically, some of China’s state-owned companies provide thousands of their workers with housing, education, health care, a reliable retirement income, and all the other benefits that used to be known as the “iron rice
bowl.” If too many of these companies were to close their doors, “chaos in
the countryside” might threaten the viability of China’s government and the
91
supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party. China’s government probably
is more concerned about avoiding problems that could lead to its own downfall than it is about any of the other issues it faces today.
Some of the nonperforming loans in sectors other than real estate are
relatively recent in origin, and certainly were made after the international
community began to focus on the fragility of the Chinese financial sector. To
some extent, this likely reflects the continued importance of personal connections in obtaining loans, particularly those loans that might not be forthcoming based solely on the underlying quality of a project. Even without the
persistence of the guanxi problem, however, it is clear that the government
wants the banks it controls to keep antiquated factories afloat even if the resulting loans worsen the health of the banks themselves.
By rescuing companies that cannot pay their debts, China is indirectly
supporting more than just its banking industry: it truly is keeping its entire
social welfare system afloat. China’s leaders seem to recognize this fact
90. One expert argued that nonperforming automobile loans account for a growing part of this problem as well. See supra note 40.
91. A Western lawyer informed me that some of these outdated factories are
diversifying by investing in real estate, trying to offset losses from their outdated but
essential manufacturing operations with investments in the hottest sector of the
twenty-first century. See also supra note 76.
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clearly, and the real question is what might happen if China’s economy slows
down to the point that the government simply is unable to keep these enterprises alive any longer. One real estate developer’s answer to my question of
whether China’s banks are stable – “They must be!” – succinctly captures the
combination of hope and faith that so many Chinese appear to feel.

VIII. CONCLUSION
China’s real estate sector still is in an early stage of development, but it
nonetheless is more mature than China’s real estate law. Despite its youth,
and despite the fact that it developed in the absence of a formal real estate
code, the Chinese real estate industry has fared remarkably well since market
concepts were re-introduced in the 1980s.
This Article has examined some of the most important features of
China’s young real estate system. By examining the types of loans and lenders that are present in China and the types of assets that a borrower can mortgage as security, it has drawn parallels with the American system while highlighting notable differences. By discussing lending standards, the ultimate
source of loan funds, and the fragility of the Chinese banking industry, it has
noted some critical policy questions that investors must consider in the future.
To many Western observers, it would appear that the Chinese real estate
market should have collapsed years ago. Yet this market seems to be thriving, and the level of confidence within China in the stability of real estate as
an investment is extremely high. Western observers and participants are sure
to follow China’s real estate markets with great interest in the coming years,
as the Chinese economy continues to grow and become more integrated with
92
An improved understanding of China’s
the economies of other nations.
legal and business systems will benefit real estate market observers and participants within China and elsewhere.

92. “China’s construction industry is a mainstay of the Chinese economy and is
projected to become the largest construction market in the world by 2010.” Ashley
Howlett, PRC CONSTRUCTION LAW – A GUIDE FOR FOREIGN COMPANIES 3 (2006).

